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Balkanizing the Balkans
Paul L. Atwood
This article seeks to place the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 's Kosovo war in
the context of the larger issue ofNATO expansion. It argues that the question of
ethnic cleansing in that province of Serbia was largely exploited by the United
States, the creator and most powerful member of the alliance, to break up the former
Yugoslavia, to divide it, and to make it more manageable for Western interests. In
the guise of stopping Serb repression, NATO seized an opportunity to build more
bases throughout southeastern Europe, including those being constructed in NATO's
newest member states, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These actions are
deeply threatening to Russia, positioned as it is in either the former USSR or in
former Warsaw Pact nations. The aim ofNATO expansion is seen as an effort to
weaken Russia, especially in the vital oil-rich Caspian Sea basin, which is being
contestedfor a pipeline to flow either to the west through Turkey and Azerbaijan or
through Russia's Caucasus region. NATO expansion also worries China, which fears
its largely Moslem, far western provinces will seek some measure of unit}' with the
Moslem republics of the old Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. NATO expansion,
far from bringing stability to Europe, is inherently destabilizing.
They have made a desolation and called it peace.
— Tacitus
The speed with which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) moved into
the Balkans in the aftermath of the fall of Communism is stunning in its audacity.
This expansion is a far cry from the outlook promoted by NATO's first military com-
mander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, shortly after he assumed command in 1950. "If
in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have
not been returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed." 1 The
establishment of new NATO bases throughout the former Yugoslavia and beyond is seen
by Russia as dangerously threatening, portending a new division of Europe and perhaps a
new Cold War or worse. If one of the central rationales for NATO's expansion is taken at
face value, namely, that the alliance must move eastward to contain conflicts which might
lead to mass outflows of refugees to Western Europe, thereby destabilizing NATO mem-
bers themselves, an endless chain of security commitments looms as more Eastern Euro-
pean nations join. As Senator Richard Lugar once said, "There can be no security at the
center without security at the periphery."2 Thus the stage is being set for renewed conflict
with Russia and with the Islamic world that abuts the progressively enlarging security
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zone. China, too, is alarmed at the growth of the North Atlantic alliance. The policies
forged by the United States may bring the peace of the sword to the Balkans for the mo-
ment, but at what future cost?
The forces that induced the breakup of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s also led to
instability in the Balkan communist regimes. Since then, in the guise of quashing ethnic
conflicts for "humanitarian" reasons, the United States has backed nationalist-separatist
movements throughout Yugoslavia, resulting in the incremental disintegration of the most
successful, prosperous, and progressive— though not without important faults— com-
munist/socialist experiments in the region. Beginning with Slovenia in 1991, the United
States and other NATO parties have fostered or encouraged independence movements in
Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, their rhetoric to the contrary
notwithstanding. In March 1999, and in close proximity to the Balkans, three new mem-
bers— former parties to the Soviet-inspired Warsaw Pact: Hungary, the Czech Republic,
and Poland— were admitted to NATO despite explicit promises to Russia that this would
not happen. NATO now has bases in Greece, Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Hun-
gary, Bulgaria, and Kosovo. In January 1999, oil-rich Azerbaijan, a short distance from
the Balkans, within the old borders of the Soviet Union itself, requested a NATO base.
What seemed inconceivable only two decades ago is now reality. What do U.S. policy-
makers view as being at stake?— the United States is the prime mover in this. The most
influential members of both parties are agreed on expansion. Would they venture to wage
a war in Serbia, in the very backyard of Russia, while ostensibly extending the olive
branch of peace and friendship to this erstwhile evil empire?
Once its World War II triumph placed the United States at the top of the global system
constructed by Europeans over the last five centuries, NATO has been the creation and
tool of this nation to achieve its objectives in Europe since 1949. In popular mythology,
the United States entered World War II by default, pushed to the extreme of battle by its
enemies. In reality, newly ascendant internationalists in Franklin D. Roosevelt's adminis-
tration saw a splendid opportunity to inject this country into the war and thereby defeat
the Axis with relative ease, simultaneously exploiting the war-induced weaknesses of its
allies, then putting the United States at the helm of the system and streamlining it for self-
serving reasons. 3 The initial rationale for NATO, the first formal military alliance in U.S.
history, was to contain Communism. The American public was led to believe in the late
1940s that the Red Army was poised to invade Western Europe.
We now know that Washington policymakers never believed this to be the case but
feared the electoral growth, and hence potential legitimation, of communist parties in
Western Europe, especially in France and Italy, in response to dire economic conditions
in the wake of World War II. A turn toward Communism or Socialism would have stifled
the internationalist objectives of those American elites who had entered World War II
precisely to make Europe and Asia safe for their vision of a rational capitalist world or-
der, one which had fractured twice in this century over rivalries among the powers that
had created it. U.S. policymakers, wielding national power in the postwar period surpass-
ingly greater than any ever achieved in history, believed an American imperium could
establish conditions favorable to a rational global order.
As National Security Council paper number 48, the first blueprint for Cold War strat-
egy, put matters in 1949, "The economic life of the modern world is geared toward ex-
pansion [requiring] establishment of conditions favorable to the export of technology and
capital and to a liberal trade policy throughout the world."4 The Marshall Plan, which
provided significant dollar capital to Western Europeans so they could purchase Ameri-
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can goods and stimulate trans-Atlantic economic revival, and NATO were "two halves of
the same walnut" in President Harry Truman's phrase. In fact, both were military applica-
tions of U.S. foreign policy designed to isolate the Soviets and put them on the defensive
while forcing them to prioritize weapons over consumer goods. It was also a way to re-
duce the former European powers to virtual subsidiaries of the burgeoning America. Inc.,
for NATO's raison d'etre also was driven by deep economic motives. American arms
manufacturers, their bankers, and numerous other contractors would provide the basic
infrastructure for the military containment of the USSR, with many guaranteed the same
profits as during World War II, mostly at U.S. taxpayer expense. Thus domestic and inter-
national economic goals and military planning were inseparable, a salient fact that re-
mains just as true to this day.
The rationale adopted in much discussion of the war over Kosovo was that NATO
should take upon itself the effort to right a wrong that no other single power or institu-
tion, including the United Nations, has been willing or able to do, that is, to stop the
ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs and restore their basic human rights. This action
is trumpeted as the first exercise of the so-called Clinton doctrine, which posits that, past
errors and omissions aside, the United States and its agents will henceforth ride to the
rescue to save lives and safeguard human rights when circumstances allow such action
without undue cost.
As always, such prescriptions are couched in highly oblique language, but in this case
the hypocrisy leaps out. For one thing, one of the NATO allies engaged in air strikes
against Serbia on behalf of the ethnically cleansed— in U.S.-manufactured planes flown
by U.S.-trained pilots— was Turkey, a nation whose record on human rights is abysmal
and whose cleansing of Armenians early in this century provided the precedent for the
Nazi genocide. Turkey has also driven at least two million Kurds from their homes, kill-
ing many more of them than the Serbs had killed Albanians— up to the time the air war
against Serbia began. While it is true that any military attempt by the United States or
NATO to stop the Turkish variety of ethnic cleansing would cost a great deal more than
the Kosovo operation (something which, of course, is not in the cards), all the United
States needs to do is cut off its arms supplies and economic aid to Ankara.
The United States could also have easily induced Indonesia to stop its barbaric activi-
ties in East Timor, where Indonesian troops or their paramilitary agents have caused the
death of at least one-third of the population since 1975, a genocidal policy if ever there
was one, long before the United Nations-mandated plebiscite resulted in an overwhelm-
ing vote for independence. Since the United States gave its blessing to Indonesia's inva-
sion of East Timor, selling it the enabling weapons in the first place, this nation shares
responsibility for the tragedy there. In both cases— and there are numerous others, such
as the atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone's civil war and the human tragedy again
looming in the Horn of Africa— Washington has been relatively silent, making only
symbolic and vacuous noises.
Meanwhile, the mainstream press covers these issues in a manner fundamentally dif-
ferent from its coverage of Kosovo. In a word, a double standard obtains for those des-
potic governments whose policies are in accord with U.S. international goals. No matter
their crimes, however egregious, no serious sanctions will be enforced against the likes of
Ankara or Jakarta. Dictatorial regimes like Serbia's and Cuba's, which do not play the
game according to the rules laid down in Washington, are subject to withering if not
cataclysmic punishments.
All of which raises the question of U.S. goals on both a global and a purely European
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level. According to the UN Charter, some regional alliances are allowed, but NATO's
actions in Kosovo violate that charter. The UN, which is supposed to be the international
monitor and peacekeeper, has been hobbled since its birth by great power Security Coun-
cil disputes and by blatant disregard in Washington. A world order in which the many
small and undeveloped nations have more or less the same role in global government as
that of individual states in the American republic, for example, California versus Rhode
Island, is not the global regime Washington wants.
The role of "globocop" has not fallen by default to the United States; American hege-
mony over the international system has been the goal of interventionist elites throughout
this century. Their vaunted idea of an open world economy in which commodities, capi-
tal, and technology flow freely across borders appears magnanimous, but it has been
readily apparent that control of resources, industrial infrastructure, and military bases
would primarily benefit the United States and the corporations the vision was designed to
protect. As James Forrestal, the first secretary of Defense put it, 'As long as we can
outproduce the world, control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb, we can
assume risks otherwise unacceptable."5 In the conception of American internationalists,
the only supranational agencies necessary for global peace and prosperity at that time
were the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, backed up by the U.S. mili-
tary and its atomic monopoly and its alliance partners.
Again, this strategy was buttressed by reference to the threat posed by international
Communism, an ideology which posited a much different vision of how to organize a
society — its own hypocrisies and shortcomings notwithstanding— one which stood in
the way of an American-led world order. Nationalism, whether of the revolutionary vari-
ety as in Vietnam or liberal as in Iran until 1953, also obstructed corporate access to the
markets and resources of the greater world. As George Kennan, the author of the contain-
ment policy, put it in 1948, "We have about 50% of the world's wealth, but only 6.3% of
the world's population . . . Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of
relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity."6
Though the Soviet Union was devastated at the end of World War II and, in the words
of historian Melvyn Leffler, "had no capacity to attack American territory and had no
ability to damage the American economy,"7 it was demonized in much the same fashion
as the Nazis had been, despite, or really because of, the fact that the Soviets defeated the
bulk of the German juggernaut. They then found themselves in possession of much of the
same territory formerly controlled by the Nazis, real estate that Washington had wished
liberated of Nazi rule on its terms. The Cold War began with a refusal by Washington to
permit international control of atomic energy through the UN, coupled with a claim that
the Soviets were occupying Eastern Europe illegitimately— virtually every country the
USSR occupied had declared war against the Soviets as allies of Hitler. The Soviet Union
was occupying Eastern Europe for exactly the same reason the United States occupied
Japan. The Cold War was intensified by a campaign to encircle the USSR with strategic
bases capable of launching Hiroshima-type bombers. This had the quite predictable effect
of stimulating the Soviets to accelerate their atomic bomb project, which succeeded in
1949, and to commit a vast proportion of their gross domestic product to military en-
largement and to tighten their totalitarian grip on their satellites. These actions, in turn,
were portrayed in the West as further evidence of the communist threat, and so on, lead-
ing to an increasingly racheted and deadly arms race, which, of course, provided the
rationale for NATO, which also came into existence, by no means an unrelated event, in
1949.
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The mission of NATO to contain the Soviets remained credible to the bulk of the U.S.
citizenry as long as the putative threat remained. When the USSR disintegrated, because
of the internal inconsistencies of Stalinism and an economy organized to meet what the
Soviets perceived as the Western threat, which stressed guns over butter, NATO's ratio-
nale also collapsed. There had always been an unstated, and more important goal, which
was to contain Washington's ostensible partners from undertaking independent economic
or military policies vis-a-vis the new world order. In the postwar era this meant, accord-
ing to Leffler, that "neither an integrated Europe, nor a united Germany nor an indepen-
dent Japan must be allowed to emerge as a third force." 8 Today these policies are con-
stantly reaffirmed, as in the infamous draft of a Pentagon Policy Planning Guidance
document, reported by The New York Times in 1993, which argued that the United States
must continue to dominate the international system by "discouraging the advanced indus-
trial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger global or re-
gional role."9 (Italics mine.) As one senior State Department official put it, testifying
before Congress in 1990 on NATO's future role, "We need NATO now for the same rea-
sons NATO was created." The danger, he continued, was that without American leader-
ship the Europeans would revert to type, "renationalize" their armed forces, play the "old
geo-political game," and "shift alliances." 10 Economically, a danger exists that Europe
might achieve something like Napoleon's envisioned Continental system or even Hitler's
planned autarky. Eastern Europe would provide raw materials and cheap labor while
Western Europe would contribute capital and high-tech industries, then close its markets
to the United States and compete with American corporations in the larger world. Such a
Europe, in Walter Russel Meade's conception, might produce its VCRs in Poland, not
China, under U.S. corporate supervision, and "would buy its wheat from Ukraine rather
than the Dakotas." 11
Thus, having been rationalized into existence to stifle Communism, it turns out that
NATO was just as much a linchpin of U.S. policy toward Western Europe — a way of
containing or at least channeling its Europeanization— and a very big business indeed,
one whose multifarious contracts, from military equipment to base construction and
maintenance, led directly to the bottom lines of many of the largest U.S. multinational
corporations, and from there to the U.S. Treasury. Multibillion-dollar budgets, many of
them funded by U.S. taxpayers, were at stake. So were the careers of many U.S. and
European officers whose services would presumably no longer be needed, prospects that
augured deep cuts in the U.S. and allied military budgets and in corporate contracts, and
a potential peace dividend for domestic social programs.
New NATO members and new bases require arms and money. According to a 1996
Congressional Budget Office study, NATO enlargement could cost U.S. taxpayers $125
billion by 2012, assuming the stability of Europe's security environment. Other studies
offer lower figures. The RAND Corporation estimates probable costs of enlargement at
between $30 and $52 billion. The Pentagon assesses even lower costs— $27 to $35
billion— but leaks from the Department of Defense admitted to low-balling figures.
"Everybody realized the main priority was to keep costs down to reassure Congress, as
well as the Russians," said one unidentified source. 12 Whatever the figures, most of the
cash flows directly to U.S.-controlled multinational corporations.
Institutionalized over a half century, NATO had become its own vested interest, one
intimately finked to and codependent with the American military-industrial complex.
That billions of dollars in annual contracts, salaries, and other expenditures would simply
vanish or be put to other uses was inconceivable to those whose investments and careers
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were at stake. If NATO was to remain viable, it would require a new and improved mis-
sion. No longer needed to thwart the Soviet bear, it would become the policeman of Eu-
rope and move audaciously to implement phases of the New World Order reaffirmed in
traditional internationalist terms by President George Bush after the Gulf War.
Ostensibly aimed at providing reason and justice to a chaotic globe, this regime is
intended to administer a system of international production and distribution headed by
the United States for the benefit of the United States and, to the extent necessary to pre-
vent them from bolting the alliance, its Western European allies. The first order of busi-
ness is Europe itself. As Leffler demonstrated in his exhaustive study of the origins of the
Cold War, the aim of Washington in the aftermath of World War II has always been to
reopen Eastern Europe to the U.S.-led system. Indeed, the United States entered the war
in Europe partly to liberate Central and Eastern Europe from Nazi rule, only to see it
occupied by the Soviets in 1945. While the Russians were willing to compromise with
their erstwhile allies, selling out nationalist/communist movements elsewhere, including
the Balkan nation of Greece, Washington, after FDR's death, employed its economic and
military preponderance to demand the East European prize completely on its terms, a
position bound to result in Soviet intransigence. The resulting Cold War prevented the
integration of the east into the U.S.-led global capitalist system, but the collapse of So-
viet-style Communism in 1991 opened opportunities that U.S. policymakers understood
and quickly moved to exploit.
Yugoslavia was one nationalist/communist movement that succeeded in remaining
outside the Soviet orbit yet resisted Western pressures to conform. Under Marshal Tito,
warring ethnic groups, particularly the Croatian Ustashe and the Muslim fascists, both of
which had been the tools of the Nazis, and the Serbian Chetniks were suppressed. The
newly resuscitated entity Yugoslavia was set on a course of socialist development inde-
pendent of the USSR and to a lesser extent of the West. Noted for its harsh, totalitarian
rule, the Tito regime nevertheless enabled Yugoslavia to prosper far in excess of the So-
viet model and allowed a progressive movement that was opposed to tribal hatred and in
favor of ethnic reconciliation to emerge.
Over the half century between the end of World War II and the collapse of Commu-
nism in the early 1990s, Yugoslavia was considered as a model for ethnic harmony,
though this was a romanticization. Extremists kept the ethnic issues alive, at least below
the surface, something Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and the late Franjo Tudjman of
Croatia would exploit for their own benefit in the 1980s. Yet simultaneously there had
grown a decided movement toward ethnic reconciliation in tandem with growing prosper-
ity, the only combination with any prospect of success. Daily life in Yugoslavia's major
cities resembled that in the west of Europe, not the dreary poverty and ideological con-
formity of the Soviet bloc. Belgrade's cafes provided hospitality to a vigorous intelligen-
tsia and artistic establishment, while Sarajevo's population was made up of many families
tied by ethnic intermarriage. When the movement against Communism gained momen-
tum, one significant faction throughout the former Yugoslavia desired more political
democracy while advocating the retention of those socialist economic institutions that
worked, something that did not comport with Western interests. Yugoslavia, which was
different from both the West and Russia, showed potential to remain independent of both
camps, something that was also anathema to both.
The United States and NATO countries have always said that their primary concern
was to end ethnic slaughter, return stability to southeastern Europe, and foster its unity
with Western Europe. Still, micronationalist independence movements among
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Yugoslavia's ethnic groups were also encouraged to secede from the moment the anti-
Communist rebellion emerged. As the most populous and strongest of the ethnic groups,
the Serbs quickly became the focus of ethnic rebellion stirred up by ultranationalists
among all ethnic minorities. Once the independence of Slovenia was recognized, with the
prospect of Croatia to follow, the Serbian nationalists began purging areas of greater
Serbia of all other groups, thereby leading directly to war in Croatia and Bosnia and. to a
lesser extent at the time, Kosovo. Atrocities became endemic on all sides, further deepen-
ing ethnic hatreds and weakening the progressives of all groups who wish to overcome
ethnic differences. As Zoran Djindjic, leader of Serbia's Democracy Party put it, "The
U.S. spent more on bombs in one day than it ever spent assisting the democracy move-
ment in Serbia." 13
The Western press focused mainly on Serb crimes, but until the expulsion of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo, the worst case of ethnic cleansing took place in the Krajina area
of what is now Croatia, where at least 300,000 Serbs were forcibly driven from their
homes and many massacred, a fact that received much less attention than atrocities car-
ried out by Serbs. One reason that Serbia wished to displace Kosovar Albanians was to
make room for the uprooted Serbs. Today, of course, Kosovo has been virtually cleansed
— of Serbs and Roma. One French peacekeeper told reporters that he had been ordered
to stand by while ethnic Albanians sought revenge against Serb families. 14 The U.S. pub-
lic supported the bombing of Serbia because the Clinton administration said that this
drastic measure was necessary to prevent genocide. While crimes against humanity cer-
tainly occurred, evidence is mounting that nothing approaching race murder was happen-
ing in Kosovo, although savage acts against ethnic Albanians intensified once Serbia
came under NATO fire.
In the guise of reining in murderous Serbs, NATO continues to break up Yugoslavia as
a prelude to privatizing its industries (Yugoslavia's auto industry was much better than
the caricature of the Yugo in the Western press, a lampoon called forth by its very suc-
cess) and ensuring that Western capital gets in on the spoils. It is often overlooked that
the former Yugoslavia and especially Belgrade are situated on the Danube, the primary
commercial waterway of southern Europe, and Kosovo is the site of Europe's richest
silver and lead mines. In Michael Parenti's words, the aim is "to break it up into little
neo-colonial, right-wing, ethnic, nationalist banana republics that can be totally kicked
around." 15 Just as the rest of the former communist states in East Europe are being "third
worldized," so will the former Yugoslavia be impoverished, with its social programs an-
nulled, and opened to Western capitalist investment at bargain-basement rates with ex-
tremely cheap labor available.
The U.S. media have systematically spun a myth that Serbia refused to sign the Ram-
bouillet Accords. No such concordance existed. The term "accords" means that both sides
had come to a mutually agreed-upon settlement, which was not true. NATO simply de-
manded that Serbia allow the organization's troops to occupy Kosovo and to transit the
rest of Serbia as well. No independent state would sign such an agreement because it
patently would surrender national sovereignty, something NATO claims to respect. The
Rambouillet wording was designed to guarantee rejection. The Serbs made a counterpro-
posal, offering to allow United Nations forces, with a component of Russian troops, to
police the human rights situation in Kosovo. NATO rejected this outright and when
Serbia subsequently abjured the NATO proposition, it was demonized as a rejectionist
outlaw from the community of nations.
Compare this with the U.S. government's laissez-faire stance toward Indonesia's
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butcheries in East Timor. UN forces have gone in to stop violence there as a result of
pressure by ordinary citizens throughout the world who believe that to do nothing is to be
guilty of a double standard. Milosevic is certainly a bloody tyrant but not much different
from many others with whom the United States has collaborated, like Suharto in Indone-
sia, Mobuto in Zaire, the Shah of Iran, and even Saddam Hussein before the Gulf War—
and to a great extent with Milosevic himself during the Dayton conferences, when he was
promised that no charges of crimes against humanity would be leveled against him for
Serb barbarities in Bosnia. The difference is that they played the game Washington's way
and for that their crimes were overlooked— even financed. If Milosevic had acceded to
NATO demands all along and cooperated with the breakup of Yugoslavia on American
terms he would be portrayed in the Western press as a great statesman, and his very real
crimes would be played down as indeed they were after the war in Bosnia.
NATO is not yet the global policeman, but it is certainly the gendarme of as much of
Europe as it believes it can finesse— a zone that is being progressively enlarged. Many
former Soviet clients, fearing the future return of their former overlord, have reached out
to NATO, which has leaped into the vacuum left by retreating Russian influence. When
the Soviet Union began to break up and announced the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact—
the mirror image of NATO— it did so on the basis of strenuous promises that NATO
would not exploit Russian weaknesses. But exploit them it has by admitting former War-
saw Pact nations and by entering into negotiations for oil exploration in the Caspian Sea
periphery of the former USSR. When we consider that two former national security ad-
visers. Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brezinski, as well as former secretary of State
James Baker, former secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and former Treasury secretary
Lloyd Benson, Democrats and Republicans alike, are consultants for U.S. oil companies
aiming to reap lucrative contracts with the government of Azerbaijan, the real aim of U.S.
foreign policy in this part of the world begins to come into focus. Major investors hope
the next oil bonanza will result from reserves beneath the Caspian Sea as other sources
are expected to diminish.
The U.S. government therefore wants the vital pipeline carrying this resource to travel
through the territories of allies, not through Russia. One can only imagine the fallout if a
stronger Russia could somehow cut off American access and divert Mexican and Venezu-
elan oil strictly to its purposes. Yet despite all claims of friendship toward Russia, most
Republicans and Democrats support measures that they hope will ensure Western control
of this critical asset, much of which was formerly located within the boundaries of the
former Soviet Union. The great race to capitalize on the known oil reserves in Russia's
former Muslim republics in Central Asia also conflicts with China's policies in that re-
gion. Turkic tribes there are poised to secede as well, hoping to align with their Islamic
fellows to the west and south. As Brezinski noted in The Grand Chess Game, the aim of
U.S. policy must be to break up and divide the former Soviet Union. That logic extends
to formerly communist Yugoslavia as well, which it seems is gradually being shaped to
serve as a launching pad for the next foray farther east.
The British called their competition with Russia for domination in southern and cen-
tral Asia in the nineteenth century the Great Game. The play was hardly confined to these
two powers. Such frolics primed the carnage of the First World War and the multiple
holocausts of the second. Hiroshima and Nagasaki ought to have been the proverbial
handwriting on the wall warning us of the endgame of such folly. Yet NATO is playing
the game for keeps, gambling that its virtuosity can avoid an apocalyptic showdown with
Russia, at its weakest condition in over half a century, despite much historical evidence
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that when threatened, Russia does not back down and reacts with force. One reason that
the Russians have reentered Chechnya with such savagery is to rebuild their former im-
age in the face of what many in Moscow perceive as deliberate tactics on the part of the
West to humiliate them. Their claim of bombing strictly military targets is a page torn
from NATO's record in Kosovo. China, too, is alarmed. At this rate, a plurality of the UN
Security Council at any one time is likely to be composed of NATO members. The notion
that the expansion of NATO will foster stability is delusory. Russia and China, frightened
by a Western military coalition on the march, are already moving to shore up a tenuous
alliance. Even if NATO is momentarily successful in its stratagems, the outlook for a
peaceful twenty-first century is inherently corrupted, and we ought not lose sight of the
dispiriting fact that the twentieth has been the bloodiest thus far. ^*
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